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Abstract:  We investigate the long run consequences of infrastructure provision on per capita income in a
panel of countries over the period 1950-1992.  Simple panel based tests are developed which enable us to
isolate the sign and direction of the long run effect of infrastructure on income in a manner that is robust
to the presence of unknown heterogeneous short run causal relationships.  Our results provide clear
evidence that in the vast majority of cases infrastructure does induce long run growth effects.  But we also
find a great deal of variation in the results across individual countries.  Taken as a whole, the results
demonstrate that telephones, electricity generating capacity and paved roads are provided at close to the
growth maximizing level on average, but are under-supplied in some countries and over-supplied in
others.  These results also help to explain why cross section and time series studies have in the past found
contradictory results regarding a  causal link between infrastructure provision and long run growth. 
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We address the issue of whether stocks of infrastructure are at, above, or below their growth
maximizing levels. Our approach is based on the growth model of Barro (1990).  Infrastructure
capital is an input into aggregate production, but it comes at the cost of reduced investment in
other types of capital.  In this approach there is an optimal level of infrastructure which
maximizes the growth rate; if infrastructure levels are set too high they divert investment away
from other capital to the point where income growth is reduced.
This model implies a simple “reduced form” relationship between income per capita and
infrastructure stocks per capita. Below the growth maximizing infrastructure level positive
shocks to infrastructure will tend to increase the level of output, while above the optimal level,
positive infrastructure shocks will tend to reduce the level of output; this can identify where each
country’s infrastructure stock stands relative to the growth-maximizing level. 
Kocherlakota and Yi (1996, 1997)  use a related approach to study the relationship between
shocks to public capital and subsequent changes in GDP in the United States and the United
Kingdom over the last 100 years and our approach is builds upon their methodology.  We use the
same intuition for the causal connection between infrastructure and growth, but our work has
several distinguishing features.  Perhaps most importantly is the distinction in our emphasis. 
Kocherlakota and Yi are interested in the existence of a long run effect while we focus on the
sign of the effect.  We estimate the effect for a large panel of countries using data from 1950 to
1992, allowing us to address the question of whether infrastructure levels have been too low, to
high, or about right over this period.  
We also employ a number of innovations.  Firstly, we use physical measures of
infrastructure, kilometers of paved roads, kilowatts of electricity generating capacity and number
of telephones rather than constructing stock estimates from investment flows. While simple2
physical measures do not correct for quality, monetary investment in infrastructure may be a
very poor guide to the amount of infrastructure capital produced (see Pritchett (1996)). 
Secondly, we find evidence of unit roots in both the GDP per capita (as do Cheung and Lai
(2000) and Lee, Pesaran and Smith (1997)) in the infrastructure data that we employ.  Such unit
roots can be removed by taking first differences but this ignores the long run relationship in the
data if the series are cointegrated.  We find that GDP per capita and infrastructure stocks are
cointegrated, and by exploiting this cointegrating relationship we develop a simple approach to
isolating the long run effect from the short run effects.  Our panel approach also permits us to
compare cross country averages of these effects.
We find that in general both short run and long run causality is bi-directional, with
infrastructure responding to GDP per capita but GDP per capita also responding to infrastructure
shocks.  Most importantly, we find evidence of a long run impact of infrastructure on GDP per
capita.  For telephones and paved roads, the sign of the effect of an increase in provision on GDP
per capita varies across countries, being positive in some but negative in others.  On average
telephones and paved roads are supplied at around the growth maximizing level, but some
countries have too few while others have too many.  It follows that the appropriate policy at the
country level will depend on country specific studies.  Our finding that some countries actually
have too much infrastructure is consistent with Devarajan, Swaroop and Zou (1996) and Ghali
(1998), who find evidence of over provision of public capital in a number of developing
countries. We find that long run effects of investment in electricity generating capacity are
positive in a large number of countries, with negative effects being found in only a few.   This
suggests that, on average, electricity may be under provided. 
Our approach allows us to make inferences based on a very simple reduced form3
(1)
relationship.  This avoids the problems of estimating the effect of infrastructure on output in a
more fully specified structural growth model (e.g. see Easterly and Rebelo (1993), Garcia-Mila,
McGuire and Porter (1996), Gramlich (1994), Holtz-Eakin (1994), Holtz-Eakin and Lovely
(1996), Holtz-Eakin and Schwartz (1995), Ghali (1998), Turnovsky and Fisher (1994), Morrison
and Schwartz  (1996)). While our approach has the advantage of simplicity, it tells us only the
direction of the net effect of infrastructure on growth, not its magnitude.
In the next section we present a stylized growth model to motivate the empirical approach
that is undertaken in this study.  In particular, we derive our simple estimated relationship as a
reduced form of a growth model.  In section 3, we carry out panel-based unit root and
cointegration tests to characterize the time series properties of our data that are relevant for our
subsequent analysis.   Finally, in section 4 we discuss how we test for the sign and the direction
of long effects between our variables and present the results of these tests.
2.  A Stylized Growth Model with Infrastructure Capital
Our model is adapted from Barro (1990). We add stochastic disturbances to his structural
equations and investigate how this affects the reduced form.  The simple model form presented
here is for illustrative purposes. As we shall see, our estimation procedure actually allows for a
somewhat more general structure.  Aggregate output Y, at time t, is produced using
infrastructure capital, G, other capital, K , and labor, L such that





s, and that both types of capital fully depreciate each period.  Next period’s infrastructure is a
proportion of savings (perhaps through a tax system or by a private sector mechanism that
channels investment based on private returns), so that 
Investment in non-infrastructure capital is determined by  
Substituting the capital accumulation equations (2) and (3) into the production function (1) 
produces a difference equation for the evolution of per capita output
To complete the model, we need to describe the evolution of technical progress,  , the share of
investment going to infrastructure,  ,  and the size of the workforce,  .  We assume that each
of these is determined by an exogenous stochastic process.  We model the log of total factor
productivity,   as 
where   for some  , and   is a stationary random variable with . 
Thus, log total factor productivity depends on a constant,  , a trend rate of growth,  , which
we take to be zero when  , plus a random term that is stationary if   and non-stationary if
. 




is a zero mean stationary series.  Finally we assume that the growth rate of population is given
by    , where   is a zero mean stationary series.  We further assume that
we can identify the workforce with the total population.  Alternatively, we can easily weaken
this to an assumption that the labor force participation rate is a stationary series.  Under these
assumptions, our difference equation can then be written in terms of log income per capita, y, as
where    and  .
    Note that all the random terms in equation (6) are stationary, except possibly total factor
productivity,  .  According to equation (6) the process for    contains a unit root whenever
 and  ,  or    and  .   We require that one of these two mechanisms
operates to explain the very persistent unit root type behavior in per capita income that we
observe in the data, but we remain agnostic as to which one is appropriate for any particular
country of our sample.   
Similarly, the process for infrastructure formation can be written in log per capita form as
We can rewrite this as
If    has a unit root,   is stationary, as are the remaining error terms in the relationship.  In
this case, g and y are cointegrated, since a linear combination of g and y produces a stationary
variable.  This will be true regardless of which assumption we use to generate the unit root in y. 6
1 In Barro’s model this is also the welfare maximizing infrastructure level.  However, in the
presence of shocks, increasing expected growth may also increase the volatility of the growth rate.
If agents are risk averse, maximizing expected growth need not maximize expected welfare. 
However, in the exogenous growth version, the driving force behind growth is technical
progress, and long run infrastructure levels simply follow income levels.  In the endogenous
growth model, on the other hand, there is the possibility that shocks to infrastructure investment
have permanent effects on the level of income.  
Furthermore, the sign of this permanent effect may be positive or negative, depending on
whether   has been set above or below the tax rate that maximizes expected growth.  Note that
expected growth is maximized when the average share of investment in infrastructure is set at
the level  that maximizes the expected value of  .  In general
this depends on the distribution of the shocks.  However, without shocks, setting 
maximizes the growth rate, as in Barro (1990).
1  We assume a fixed savings rate so that
investment in infrastructure represents a diversion from other types of capital.  In practice,
setting a sub-optimal level of   reduces the rate of return to capital as a whole and may reduce
the savings rate and further lower the growth rate.  Furthermore, it is important to notice that by
treating the savings rate as fixed, we are in effect taking the key margin over long periods to be
the allocation between different types of investment, rather than between the total level of
investment and consumption.
We now summarize each of these results in the following proposition.7
Proposition 1.   For the model specified by equations (1) through (8), 
( ) If    and  , or   and  , then:
log per capita output,  , and log per capita infrastructure series,  , will each be non-
stationary and integrated of order one, but there will exist a cointegrating vector (possibly
different for each country) such that some linear combination of   and   will be stationary.
Shocks to productivity have a long run positive effect on log per capita output  .  
(ii) If    and  , then: 
shocks to per capita infrastructure,  , have no long run effect on per capita output, y.
(iii)  If    and  , then:
shocks to per capita infrastructure,  , will have a nonzero long run effect on per capita
output,  .  For small shocks, the sign of this effect will be positive if   , and negative if 
.
The proof of proposition 1 is straightforward and can be found in the longer working paper
version of this study, Canning and Pedroni (1999).  In the neoclassical version of the model,
shocks to infrastructure have no long run effect.  In the endogenous growth version of the model,
a positive shock to infrastructure increases income per capita when  , and decreases income
per capita when  .  It should be noted that all of our results are for small changes to
infrastructure investment, since large changes could conceivably move the system across the
optimal infrastructure level into a different regime.
Given these results for the reduced form structure of the model, we can estimate a bivariate
relationship between income per capita and infrastructure stocks per capita, and test which
version of the model best describes the long run properties of the data.  The model described in
this section represents a typical country of our data set.  To apply the model to a panel of8
countries we assume that all variables and innovations terms in the model carry a double index
 to represent the value of the variable in country   at time t.   Furthermore, any parameters of
the model are assumed to be indexed by an   subscript, so that we allow all of these to vary
across countries.  These include for example, the income share parameters of the production
function,   and  , the savings rate, s, the average share of infrastructure investment   , and the
persistence of the technology shock  . 
Finally, we should emphasize that for our empirical implementation, we simply require that
the data be characterized by the properties described in the results of proposition 1.  This
characterization can be expected to apply to a broad class of similar models.
3.  The Data
Our data are annual and cover the period 1950-1992. We  use GDP per worker from the Penn
World Tables 5.6 (see Summers and Heston (1991)).  The infrastructure data are from Canning
(1998), which gives physical infrastructure measured on an annual basis, in kilometers of paved
road, kilowatts of electricity generating capacity, and the number of telephones. 
We deflate each variable by population so as to obtain per capita values, and then take logs
of these per capita values. This means we have variables representing log GDP per capita, log
paved roads per capita, log electricity generating capacity per capita, and log telephones per
capita.  If the services provided by the infrastructure stocks are a rival good, then these simple
measures can be thought of as the average consumption of infrastructure services per capita.  We
begin by investigating the time series properties of the data.
 9
2As shown in the Monte Carlo studies reported in Pedroni (2004), nuisance parameters that
are associated with the serial correlation properties of individual member country time series are
eliminated asymptotically as T grows large relative to N, which suggests that we should give more
weight to the time dimension when balancing the panel in order to avoid size distortion.  The power
of the tests, on the other hand, rises most dramatically with the N dimension, and rapidly approaches
100% against stationary but near unit root alternative hypotheses for the estimated residuals, even
in relatively short panels.
3.1 Testing for Unit Roots 
We wish to test for non-stationarity against the alternative that the variable is trend
stationary, where we allow different intercepts and time trends for each country.  We use the unit
root test proposed by Im, Pesaran and Shin (2003), which allows each panel member to have a
different autoregressive parameter and short run dynamics under the alternative hypothesis of
trend stationarity.   To carry out the unit root and cointegration tests, we select countries and
time periods for each variable to construct a balanced panel, which entails a trade-off between
the time span and number of countries in the sample.
2   For income per capita and electricity
generating capacity we take as our period 1950-1992.  However for telephones and paved roads
we limit the period to 1960-1990 and 1961-1990 respectively, in order to get a reasonable
number of countries into the sample.  When we come to look at the bivariate relationship the
coverage of the data set is always the same as for the infrastructure variable.  As suggested by
Im, Pesaran and Shin, before carrying out the tests the data are purged of any common effects
across countries by regressing each variable on a set of time dummies and taking residuals. 
The results of these unit root tests for each of our variables are shown in table 1.  The test is
based on the average of the adjusted Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test statistics calculated independently
for each member of the panel, with five lags to adjust for auto-correlation. The adjusted test
statistics, (adjusted using the tables in Im, Pesaran and Shin (2003)) are distributed as N(0,1)10
(9)
under the null of a unit root, and large negative values lead to rejection of a unit root in favor of
stationarity.  
In no case can we reject the null hypothesis that every country has a unit root for the series in
log levels.   We then test for a unit root in first differences, though in this case the alternative
hypothesis is stationarity without a trend, since any time trend in levels is removed by
differencing. When we use first differences, the test statistic is negative and significant in each
case. This indicates that we have stationarity in first differences and each of the four variables
can be regarded as I(1).  In what follows we will proceed on the assumption that all log level
variables are I(1) and all log differenced variables are I(0).
3.2 Testing for Cointegration
Now we turn to the question of possible cointegration between each infrastructure variable
and GDP per capita. Given the possibility of reverse causality between the variables we use
panel cointegration technique from Pedroni (1999, 2004) which is robust to causality running in
both directions and allows for both heterogeneous cointegrating vectors and short run dynamics
across countries.  In particular, the cointegrating regression that we estimate is
so that each country has its own relationship between git , the log per capita infrastructure
variable, and yit , log per capita income. The variable eit  represents a stationary error term.  Note
that we allow the slope of the cointegrating relationship to differ from unity and to vary across
countries. This reflects the fact that in practice the relationship between infrastructure
investment, infrastructure stocks, and income per capita may be more complex than set out in11
equation (2).   Furthermore, this allows for the possibility that in practice, growth need not be
balanced, so that the ratio of capital stocks to output need not be one.  The common time
dummies, bt ,  capture any common worldwide effects that would tend to cause the individual
country variables to move together over time.  These may be either relatively short term business
cycle effects, or longer run effects such as worldwide changes in technology that may affect the
relative costs or benefits of infrastructure and thus the equilibrium relationship.  
The residuals of this regression are used to construct an ADF based group mean panel
cointegration test which is analogous to the Im, Pesaran and Shin (2003) ADF unit root test. In
table 2 we report the average over countries of the ADF t-test calculated from the residuals from
regression (9) with a lag length of up to 5 years. Adjustment values to construct the test statistic
are from Pedroni (2004), which allows for the fact that we are testing residuals from an
estimated relationship rather than the true relationship.   Large negative values imply stationarity
of the residuals and lead to a rejection of no cointegration.  As the results make clear, we reject
the null of no cointegration in each of the three cases.  Consequently, in what follows we will
proceed on the assumption that each of our series is non-stationary, but that there is cointegration
between each infrastructure variable and GDP per capita.
4.  Long Run Effects; Empirical Implementation and Econometric Issues
Having established a long run relationship between infrastructure and income we now turn to the
issue of causality.  In particular, we are interested in whether innovations to infrastructure stocks
have a long run effect on GDP per capita and what the sign of such an effect is.  We begin this
section by setting out tests for the presence and sign of such long run effects and then proceed to
carry out these tests on our data.12
(10)
Since in each country the series g and y are individually non-stationary but together are
cointegrated, we know from the Granger representation theorem, (Engle and Granger, (1987))
that these series can be represented in the form of a dynamic error correction model.  To estimate
the error correction form we employ a two step procedure.  In the first step, we estimate the
cointegrating relationship between log per capita income and log per capita output given in
equation (9) for each country, using the Johansen (1988, 1991) maximum likelihood procedure. 
In the second step, we use this estimated cointegrating relationship, to construct the
disequilibrium term,     We then estimate the error correction model 
The variable eit represents how far our variables are from the equilibrium relationship and the
error correction mechanism estimates how this disequilibrium causes the variables to adjust
towards equilibrium in order to keep the long run relationship intact.  The Granger representation
theorem implies that at least one of the adjustment coefficients   must be non-zero if a
long run relationship between the variables is to hold.
By proposition (1), shocks to income have a persistent, positive component.  Furthermore,
the Granger representation theorem places restrictions on the singular long run response matrix
of the moving average representation for the data in differences. This restricts the relationship
between the long run response matrix and the speed of adjustment coefficients   in the
error correction representation. We can exploit these two pieces of information to test for the
existence, and the sign, of any long run causal effects running from innovations in log per capita13
infrastructure to log per capita output.  We summarize our results in the following proposition;
the derivation can be found in the longer working paper version of this study, Canning and
Pedroni (1999).
Proposition 2.  Under the specification of our growth model,
(I) The coefficient,  , on the lagged equilibrium cointegrating relationship in the dynamic error
correction equation for   is zero if, and only if, innovations to log per capita infrastructure
have no long run effect on log per capita output.
(ii) The ratio of the coefficients,  , on the lagged equilibrium cointegrating relationship in
the dynamic error correction equations for  and  , has the same sign as the long run effect
of innovations to log per capita infrastructure on log per capita output.
It follows from proposition 2 that we can test hypotheses about the long run effect of
infrastructure on output by testing restrictions on the estimated coefficients in the dynamic error
correction equations.  According to proposition 2, a test for the significance of   for any one
country can be interpreted, conditional on our growth model, as a test of whether innovations to
per capita infrastructure have a long run effect on per capita output, and a test for the sign of the
ratio   can be interpreted as a test of the sign of the long run effect of innovations to per
capita infrastructure on per capita output. Note that proposition 2(ii) need not necessarily hold
for cointegrated systems in general; the proof relies both on the Granger representation theorem
and specific features of the growth model set out in section 2.  
The advantage of our two step estimation procedure, first estimating the cointegrating
relationship and then the error correction mechanism, is that all the variables in equation system
(10) are stationary.  Asymptotically, the fact that we use the estimated disequilibrium rather than
the true disequilibrium in (10) does not affect the standard properties of our estimates, due to the14
3Toda and Phillips (1993) study these properties in the context of more conventional dynamic
Granger causality tests in cointegrated systems.  See also Urbain (1992) for a related discussion on
testing causality in error correction models.
4 See, for example, Faust and Leeper (1998) for a discussion of these issues.  Furthermore,
as Phillips (1998) demonstrates, inferences for such long horizon impulse responses are very
sensitive to misspecification of the underlying unit root and cointegration properties of the data.
well known superconsistency properties of the estimator of the cointegrating relationship.
3 It
follows that we can carry out standard hypothesis tests on the coefficients estimated in the
system. 
  By exploiting the cointegrating relationship we are able to summarize the long run effects of
the innovations in the variables in terms of two parameters,   and   .  This contrasts with
using the differenced variables in a stationary vector autoregressive (VAR) representation to
estimate the impulse responses over long horizons.   The tradeoff is that we only test for the
existence and sign of long run effects rather than obtaining a quantitative measure of the size of
these effects.  On the other hand, as is well known, the standard errors for VAR based estimates
of impulse responses over long horizons are notoriously large and unreliable, making inference
difficult.
4  In essence, by exploiting the cointegrating relationships present in the data, and
summarizing the long run effects of our growth model in a small number of parameters, we
avoid the problems of inference that are typically associated with summing sequences of impulse
response coefficients over a long horizon.  
4.1  Causality Tests
We now turn to the empirical results of our tests.  However, before implementing these tests
for long run causal effects, we begin by asking a simpler question.  We test whether the15
5 Under the null of no causality, the percentage of countries rejecting at 10% significance
level has an expected value of 10 with a standard deviation of 30N
-1/2 (for N large). Using this
distribution, the number of countries in which we reject no causality is significantly greater than
expected even at the 1% level. 
coefficients on lagged infrastructure changes and the error correction adjustment parameter in
the regression explaining income changes are all zero.  This is a test of no causal effect from
infrastructure shocks to income either in the short run or the long run.  We also test for causality
running in the other direction from income to infrastructure.  These tests correspond to the usual
Granger causality tests in that they are tests of whether one variable evolves entirely
exogenously from another.  
Column two of table 3 reports the percentage of countries that reject an F-test of the
hypothesis of no causality at the 10% significance level.  One interpretation of these results is
that causality seems to occur in some countries, but not in others.  However, if there really were
no causality, we would expect to reject this hypothesis, and accept causality in 10% the of
countries, if we use the 10% significance level for our test.  Rejection in a larger number of
countries can be taken as evidence against the hypothesis that there is no causality in any
country.  Using this criterion, we have strong evidence in favor of causality running in both
directions between each of our infrastructure variables and GDP, since we find rejections of no
causality in a great deal more than 10% of countries.
5 
A test of the joint hypothesis of no causality in any country is given in column three of table
3.  This is a likelihood ratio test of the hypothesis that all the relevant parameters are zero in
every country. Under the null of no causality the test statistic is distributed as chi-squared with
degrees of freedom equal to the number of restrictions imposed, which is given in parentheses
beneath the statistic.  Large values of this statistic lead to rejection of the null hypothesis of no16
causality.  Again, evidence supports two-way causality between these variables and GDP per
capita and each of our infrastructure variables.  The fact that non-causality is rejected in a
significant number of countries supports the idea that the results for the likelihood test of non-
causality in any country are not being driven by a small number of extreme estimates in a few
countries. 
4.2 Tests for the Presence of Long Run Effects 
The conventional Granger causality results indicate two way feedback.   However, the
causality associated with this feedback may be only of a short run nature, so that innovations to
infrastructure have an impact on GDP per capita from business cycle or multiplier effects that
eventually die out and do not have a lasting effect on long run growth.  
Therefore, we now turn to the issue of whether infrastructure investment affects long run
economic growth.   Since our variables are cointegrated, proposition 2 gives us some simple
tests.  The first test that we consider is a joint test of the hypothesis that the adjustment
parameter     is zero in every country, i.e. that there is no long run effect of infrastructure on
income.  We report the results of this test in column 1 of table 4.  This likelihood ratio test
provides strong evidence against the long run effect being uniformly zero among all countries,
and easily rejects the null of no long run effect at the 1% significance level in each case.   
4.3 Tests for the Sign of the Long Run Effect
First, we ask whether the parameters are homogeneous across countries.  In table 5 we report the
results for tests of homogeneity of the long run adjustment parameters across countries.  The test17
6 This is only a test that    for all  , but it is easy to check that the test statistic is larger
for any other test of the form  .  It follows that if we reject     for all  , we reject  
for all  , for any choice of 
(11)
that we use for homogeneity is a Wald test. For a parameter  , the test statistic is calculated as 
where   is the weighted mean of the country specific parameters (weighted by the inverse of
their variances).
6   Using this test, we decisively reject homogeneity of     across countries. 
Furthermore, when we test the ratio   , which we call the sign parameter, we reject
homogeneity for telephones and paved roads, though in this case only at the 10% significance
level.   However, it is interesting to note that we do not reject homogeneity of the sign parameter
across countries in the case of electricity. These results are important when we interpret our tests
for the sign of the long run effects.  
Given the likelihood of heterogeneity of the parameter estimates across countries, we now
examine the distribution of these estimates (rather than simply pooling them and examining the
sign of the average). The first column of table 6 gives the weighted means of  the sign parameter
estimates across countries, with weights given by the inverse of the estimated coefficient
variance.  The average estimated value is close to zero.
This suggests that the long run effects of increased provision of telephones and paved roads
on growth are close to zero on average across countries, but that there are significant nonzero
long run effects in individual countries. We can see this when we look at column 2, of table 6. 
While the average of the sign parameter is zero for telephones, a significantly greater number of
countries reject a zero parameter than should occur by chance. In columns 3 and 4 of table 6 we18
perform one sided tests where the alternative to no effect is a negative and a positive effect
respectively. The number rejecting non-causality for telephones in favor of  a positive effect and
in favor of a negative effect are both significantly larger than would be predicted by pure
sampling variation and are approximately equal to one another.  It follows that while telephones
appear to have long run effects, the direction of the effect varies across countries.  This implies
that some countries are below, while others are above, their optimal level of provision of
telephones relative to the growth maximizing level.  
For paved roads we get a similar result with the mean of the sign parameter being close to
zero and some countries have significant positive, and some significant negative, effects. 
However, the number of countries with significant negative effects, at 21%, is somewhat larger
indicating the possibility that negative effects, and oversupply of roads, is the more common
condition.
In the case of electricity generating capacity, the fact that we do not reject homogeneity of
the sign parameter leads to a somewhat different interpretation of the results in table 6.  It
implies that it is possible to interpret the mean as an estimate of a single parameter that holds in
each country.  However, we again find it hard to determine the sign of the mean; while we
estimate a positive effect, it is not significantly different from zero.  This implies electricity is
supplied at about its optimal level. The number of individual countries producing rejections of a
zero value for the sign parameter is also not greater than we would anticipate based on pure
sampling variation, which is consistent with the idea that the actual parameters are actually all
zero.  However, in one sided tests, there are a significant number of countries where shocks to
electricity generating capacity tend to have a positive effect on long run economic growth. It
appears that electricity generating capacity is under provided in some countries. Overall, for19
electricity the results are consistent with all countries being at the optimal level of provision,
though there is some evidence of positive effects of electricity on long run growth rates in some
countries.  
One potential source of heterogeneity in our results is that we are pooling countries at very
different levels of income per capita. Disaggregating by income group we find very similar
results to those we have reported for the whole sample, though there is some evidence that paved
roads are more likely to have a positive effect on income growth in developing countries while
the positive effect of electricity provision is mainly found among richer countries.  (See the
longer working paper version of this study, Canning and Pedroni (1999) for further details).  
5. Conclusion
Infrastructure must be paid for.   According to our model, there is a growth maximizing level of
infrastructure above which the diversion of resources from other productive uses outweighs the
gain from having more infrastructure.  Below this level, increases in infrastructure provision
increase long run income, while above this level an increase in infrastructure reduces long run
income.  It follows that we can use the effect of shocks to infrastructure provision on long run
income levels as a test of where a country’s infrastructure stock stands relative to its optimum
level from a growth maximizing perspective.  This is conceptually a very simple test since it
does not rely on knowing the full structure of the system being examined. 
  Our results are interesting from the point of view of economic policy.  Rather than simply
asking whether there is evidence for a strong relationship between public infrastructure and long
run incomes, we are able to isolate the presence of an effect of infrastructure on income while
controlling for the reverse effect that income levels are likely to have on infrastructure provision. 20
7 For example Bils and Klenow (2000) provide strong evidence for the quantitative
importance of controlling for the effect of growth on education when examining the effect of
education on growth.
Furthermore, by identifying the sign of this long run effect our approach allows for the fact that
infrastructure provision may divert resources from other forms of non-infrastructure investment
and asks whether the level of provision is likely to be above or below the optimum from a
growth maximizing perspective.   In this context, it will be interesting in future research to
explore whether other forms of public investment such as education stand relative to their
growth maximizing levels.
7   Finally, we are able to show that allowing for heterogeneity across
countries is also very important for policy purposes; average results for groups of countries tend
to disguise large differences between countries. 
For telephones and paved roads we find no evidence of a worldwide infrastructure shortage. 
For these, we find that on average countries are near the growth maximizing levels of
infrastructure provision, although a significant number of countries are over providing while in
others there is under provision.  For electricity generating capacity our results can be taken to
support the view that countries are all close to the optimal level of provision, though we do have
some evidence of under provision in some countries.
    In some ways our results are not surprising.   If infrastructure were provided in competitive
markets, and there were no externalities present, this optimality result would be exactly what we
would expect.  However, in practice, infrastructure has often been supplied by the public sector,
and we have the possibility of large externalities, perhaps leading to misallocation of resources. 
In this context it could be said that the finding of optimality, even if just on average, is more
surprising.  For policy purposes our results point to the need for detailed country studies of the21
type employed by Fernald (1999) in order to find appropriate rates of return to infrastructure.  
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Table 1
Panel Unit Root Tests






log GDP per Capita 1950-1992 51 -2.164 -1.116
log EGC per Capita 1950-1992 43 -1.908 0.160
log TEL per Capita 1960-1990 67 -1.333 4.192
log PAV per Capita 1961-1990 42 -1.815 0.291
∆ log GDP per Capita 1951-1992 51 -2.465 -3.465***
∆ log EGC per Capita 1951-1992 43 -2.688 -4.863***
∆ log TEL per Capita 1961-1990 67 -2.172 -2.310**
∆ log PAV per Capita 1962-1990 42 -2.889 -5.992***
Notes:   The test statistics are distributed as N(0, 1) under the null hypothesis of non-
stationarity.  The statistics are constructed using small sample adjustment factors from Im,
Pesaran, and Shin (1996).  The symbols * (**,***) denote significance at 10%, (5%, 1%)
levels.
EGC represents kilowatts of electricity generating capacity.
TEL represents the number of telephones.
PAV represents kilometers of paved roads.25
Table  2
Panel Cointegration Tests
Period Countries Average ADF    Test Statistic
    Y and TEL 1960-1990 67 -2.33 -3.04***
    Y and EGC 1950-1992 43 -2.28 -2.02**
    Y and PAV 1961-1990 42 -2.27 -1.90**
Notes:   The test statistics are distributed as N(0, 1) under the null hypothesis of no
cointegration.  The statistics are constructed using adjustment values from Pedroni (2004).
The symbols * (**,***) denote significance at 10%, (5%, 1%) levels.   
Table 3 
Granger Causality Tests
Null Hypothesis: Number of                 countries rejecting  Full Sample
No Causality Countries   null at the 10%  likelihood        
N significance level ratio test
(percentage)
Y does not cause TEL 67 37.7*** 850***
 (335)
Y does not cause EGC 43 51.2*** 504***
(215)
Y does not cause PAV 42 45.2*** 695***
(210)
TEL does not cause Y 67 46.3*** 801***
(335)
EGC does not cause Y 43 30.2*** 368***
(215)
PAV does not cause Y 42 42.9*** 424***
(210)
Notes:   Under the null hypothesis of a parameter value of zero in every country, the
percentage rejecting at the 10% significance level has an expected value 10 with a standard
error of 30N
-1/2 .   The likelihood ratio test is distributed as chi-squared with the degrees of
freedom given in parentheses.   The symbols * (**,***) denote significance at 10%, (5%,
1%) levels.   26
Table 4
Tests for Presence of Long Run Effects
Null Hypothesis:  No Long Run Effects from Infrastructure to Income
Test of 
Likelihood Ratio Test
TEL to Y 325***
(67)
EGC to Y 164***
(43)
PAV to Y 211***
(42)
Notes:   All test statistics are distributed as chi-squared under the null hypothesis, with the
degrees of freedom given in parenthesis.  The symbols * (**,***) denote significance at
10%, (5%, 1%) levels.   
Table 5
Tests of Parameter Homogeneity for Long Run Effects Across Countries
Null Hypothesis: Homogeneity of parameters across countries
Test of  Test of 
Wald Test Wald Test
TEL to Y 232*** 101***
(67) (67)
EGC to Y 124*** 46
(43) (43)
PAV to Y  153*** 57*
(42) (42)
Notes:   Test statistics are distributed as chi-squared under the null hypothesis, with the
degrees of freedom given in parenthesis.  The symbols * (**,***) denote significance at
10%, (5%, 1%) levels.   27
Table 6
Distribution of Parameters
Group Mean Percentage of Countries Rejecting Null:
(weighted)
 Alternative:
TEL to Y -0.014 14.9* 16.4**            16.4**
N=67 (0.023)
EGC to Y 0.024 14.0 9.3 16.3*
N=43 (0.028)
PAV to Y 0.027 16.7* 21.4*** 9.5
N=42 (0.061)
(Standard errors in parenthesis)
Notes:   Under the null hypothesis of a parameter value of zero in every country, the
percentage rejecting at the 10% significance level has an expected value 10 with a standard
error of 30N
-1/2 .   The likelihood ratio test is distributed as chi-squared with the degrees of
freedom given in parentheses.   The symbols * (**,***) denote significance at 10%, (5%,
1%) levels.   28
   Mathematical Appendix
Proposition 1: (i) Using equation (6) it is easy to show that y has unit root under either
specification, and cointegration of y and g  follows directly from equation (8).   In equation (6),
when  , exogenous technology,  , follows a random walk, and innovations to productivity
have a permanent effect on y even when  .  When  , the endogenous process for
output accumulation is no longer mean reverting, so that when exogenous technology is mean
reverting, with  , innovations to productivity have a permanent effect on y.   Finally, since
, positive innovations to productivity lead to positive long run effects.
(ii)  Shocks to infrastructure,  , only affect the steady state through their effect on y.  But when
, variations in y eventually dissipate since the parameter in the difference equation (6) is
less than one.     
(iii)  In this case all shocks to output are permanent.  The long run effect of an infrastructure
shock to log output per capita is the same as the short run effect and is given by
Hence
Evaluating this at  , and setting  we have 
It follows that for   small positive shocks to infrastructure raise output in both the short
run and the long run while for    small positive shocks tend to reduce output.  Q.E.D.      29
Proposition 2:   Let    be the stationary moving average representation for the
differenced data   in terms of the innovations  , so that
represents the matrix of long run responses of the levels   to innovations in  .   So 
represents the long run effect of j on i, and we are particularly interested in  , the long run
effect of infrastructure on output.  According to the Granger representation theorem (Engle and
Granger, (1987)), if the individual series of   are cointegrated, then the long run response
matrix   will contain a singularity such that  , where   is the vector of
adjustment coefficients to the error correction term in the ECM representation given in equation
(10).   This implies  .
According to our proposition 1, part (i), we know that innovations to per capita output
productivity must have a positive long run effect on per capita output under either
parameterization of the model, so that  . Under cointegration an error correction
mechanism exists, we cannot have both elements of  equal to zero.  Combined with the
restriction that  , this implies  if and only if   , which establishes part (i)
of the proposition.  
Furthermore, suppose  .  Since  this implies  , which would
contradict the fact that there is an error correction mechanism and the series are cointegrated. 
Hence   and we can write  . The restriction   implies that the
ratio    has the same sign as , which establishes part (ii) of the proposition.  Q.E.D.